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Abstract
The theory of ”Judo Economics” describes an optimal entry strategy for small firms. Using a
capacity limitation, small firms force dominant market incumbents to accommodate. In this
article, we study the power of Judo economics as an entry strategy in different market envi-
ronments. We find experimental evidence supporting the theory in the original setting with
a monopolistic, dominant market incumbent. When we introduce a cost advantage for small
firms, profits go down. This can be explained by incumbents responding aggressive towards
large entrants. For settings with multiple market incumbents, results are reversed. There, a
cost advantage strengthens small firms and pricing below the incumbents’ marginal cost pro-
vides the unique entry strategy.
Keywords: Judo economics; Market entry; Price competition; Capacity limitation; Experimen-
tal economics
JEL: D43; L11
”To capture the image of a small firm using its rival’s large size to its own advantage,
we call this a strategy of judo economics.” [Gelman and Salop (1983), p. 315.]
1 Introduction
The term Judo economics was originally coined by Gelman and Salop (1983). In their study, a
market entry game is analyzed where a single entrant faces a monopolistic incumbent. Assuming
products are not differentiated, the incumbent’s cost of production is not higher, and the incumbent
has loyal customers, she always has the possibility to match the entrant’s price without making
losses or losing customers to him.1 Potential entrants can thus always be deterred. In case of a
credible capacity limitation, however, accommodating instead of deterring his entry may actually
be the optimal strategy for the incumbent. If the entrant commits himself to serve only a part of
the customers at a low price, the incumbent is better off giving up those customers than serving
all customers at the entry deterrence price. Hence, using a strict capacity limitation, the entrant
can expect to be accommodated.
∗University of Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management, Universitaetsplatz 2, 39106 Magdeburg, Ger-
many, cracau@ovgu.de
†University of Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management, Universitaetsplatz 2, 39106 Magdeburg, Ger-
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1W.l.o.g. we use female pronouns for the dominant incumbents and male pronouns for the small entrants.
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The obvious asymmetry between the two firms in the Judo model can also be observed in real
market interactions, because it captures market settings with a dominant (global) firm and a small
(local) competitor.2 Small firms limit their sales to avoid competition with dominant incumbents.
Several examples can be found in various sectors around the world. Sørgard (1995) reports Judo
competition in the breakfast cereals sector in the United Kingdom (Viota vs. Kellogg) and in the
cement industry in Norway (Viking Cement vs. Norcem). The prime example for the application of
Judo economics can, however, be found in the airline industry. Wilson (1996) presents the story of
Kiwi Airlines that entered business in 1992 with only two leased airplanes. The airline exclusively
served the route Chicago-Newark-Orlando-Chicago. As this limitation of size was credible, Kiwi
airline was not seen as a threat by the market incumbents and was thus able to gain positive profits
in the highly competitive flight market.
In this article, we combine a game theoretic model based on Gelman and Salop (1983) with an
experimental approach, comparing four different market settings. Our results show that as predicted
for the original framework with equal cost and one dominant firm, the majority of small firms limit
their capacity and are accommodated. In many cases, both firms even achieve higher payoffs
than in equilibrium due to tacit collusion on prices. When the small firms have a cost advantage,
their observed payoffs are lower than in the symmetric setting. This is surprising, since their cost
advantage theoretically provides a greater market power. When we replace the single monopolist by
a competition between two dominant firms, we find that small firms without a cost advantage are
more likely to be deterred. Small firms with a cost advantage, facing two competing dominant firms,
are able to utilize their market power but cannot achieve payoffs that go beyond the equilibrium
predictions. Hence, our results in both settings with competition amongst two dominant firms are
in line with theory.
2 Related literature
Most of the literature on market entry focuses on market incumbents’ strategies to deter entry.
Dixit (1979) analyzes competition between an established firm and a potential market entrant.
The game is modeled as a sequential quantity competition, where the established firm acts as a
leader. Although Dixit (1979) focuses on the effect of product differentiation, his findings can
be related to our study. He shows that holding an excess capacity can be an optimal strategy
for the incumbent to deter entry. This finding is somewhat inverse to the Judo effect, where the
entrant’s commitment to a limited capacity results in accommodation being the optimal strategy
for the incumbent. In an extension of his basic model, Dixit (1980) points out that the incumbent’s
investment decision on capacity has a significant impact on entry deterrence, even under more
general assumptions on post-entry competition.
2In this article, we will mainly use the label small firms and dominant firms to refer to entrants and incumbents,
which are the terms used in Gelman and Salop (1983).
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Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) study the effect of incumbent’s advertising on accommodation. Their
model predicts that the level of advertising is low, if the incumbent chooses to deter entry. Since
this keeps his own and the entrants’ products similar in the customers’ perception, it makes a price
war more credible in case of market entry. However, if the incumbent uses advertising to increase
its stock of goodwill, it softens price competition and thus makes entry easier. The similarity of the
Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) model and the Gelman and Salop (1983) model is that the incumbent
has a tradeoff between asking high prices from the customers that she retains after entry and
reducing prices for all customers to keep the entire market.
The core idea of Judo has also been extended to more elaborate settings. The Judo outcome in
competitive as well as cooperative settings has been acknowledged. Sørgard (1995), for example,
analyzes the basic model of Gelman and Salop (1983), but assumes a repeated pricing game after
the initial entry decision. Assuming the entrant expects the incumbent’s response to be collusive,
the entrant will not limit his capacity to make the non-collusive outcome less attractive for the
incumbent. Allen et al. (2000) analyze sequential capacity choice before a simultaneous price
competition. Assuming the incumbent has a cost advantage, they derive that the she installs a
capacity to induce the Judo equilibrium. Dı´az et al. (2009) study a two-stage price competition
with exogenous capacity constraints. First, firms announce a list price and in the second stage,
firms are able to offer discounts. They show that in some cases the low-capacity firm follows a
low pricing strategy that corresponds a Judo strategy. Dechenaux and Kovenock (2011) study
infinetely repeated simultaneous price and quantity competitions. They show that a stationary
perfect equilibrium exists in which the small firm limits both its prices and its capacity and the
dominant firm acommodates. This result underlines that Judo-type equilibria are not only relevant
for one-shot games but also for repeated games.
Most experiments on market entry focus on the coordination between potential entrants (without
incumbents) in simultaneous move games, see for example Rapoport (1995), Camerer and Lovallo
(1999), Zwick and Rapoport (2002) and Duffy and Hopkins (2005). In one of the rare experimental
studies on a sequential market entry game, Jung et al. (1994) analyze an experimental chain store
game. In each market there is either a strong or weak monopolist who faces random entrants.
In each period, an entrant chooses whether to enter a market. For strong monopolists it is a
dominant strategy to fight entry, while for weak monopolists accommodation is more beneficial.
Since the history of monopolists’ responses is observable, the entrants’ decision can be based on the
monopolists’ reputation. Experimental results show that weak monopolists use predatory pricing
to imitate stronger ones and manage to deter entry in later periods.3
Thomas (1999) analyzes empirical data to compare incumbents’ observed behavior with theoretical
predictions. Besides new products and advertising, incumbents mainly use an aggressive price
response to compete with new entrants. Moreover, he finds empirical support for the Judo concept,
3Former experimental results are ambiguous, e.g. Harrison (1988) reports predatory pricing whereas Isaac and
Smith (1985) failed to observe it in various settings where they had expected it.
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where incumbents respond less aggressively towards small scale entrants than to large entrants.
3 Four simple Market Entry Games
3.1 Monopoly with Entry and Symmetric Cost
This is the original setting studied by Gelman and Salop (1983). We assume that a dominant
firm serves the market as a monopolistic incumbent. A second, small firm can decide to enter the
market with a homogeneous good. We assume that the marginal cost c is constant and equal for
both firms. W.l.o.g. we set c = 0. Consumers’ preferences are assumed to be lexicographical, i.e.
the low price product is preferred, but if prices are equal the dominant firm’s product is preferred.
The small firm has to decide simultaneously on a price and a capacity and then the dominant firm
chooses its price.
Proposition 1. In the non-cooperative equilibrium with one small firm and one dominant firm
with symmetric cost, entry is always accommodated.
Proof. The proof follows Gelman and Salop (1983).
If the capacity is not limited, the dominant firm matches the small firm’s price, leaving the small
firm with zero profits. Therefore, the small firm does not enter without limiting his capacity.4 If
capacity is limited, the small firm chooses a price and capacity combination that is small enough
so that the dominant firm is better off accommodating entry by serving the residual demand at a
high price, instead of deterring the small firm’s entry by matching its price.
Knowing the small firm’s price p¯SF and capacity k¯, the dominant firm may either match the small
firm’s price (pDF = p¯SF ) or accommodate (pDF > p¯SF ). In the first case, the dominant firm serves
the entire market at the price p¯SF and has a profit of π
match
DF (pDF ) = pDFD(pDF ) = p¯SFD(p¯SF ).
In the second case, the dominant firm serves only the residual demand and therefore maximizes its
profit πaccomDF (pDF ) = pDF
(
D(pDF )− k¯
)
with pDF > p¯SF .
5 As the small firm has to ensure that
entry is accommodated, it must choose a pair (pSF , k) that fulfills the condition π
match
DF ≤ πaccomDF ,
i.e. the dominant firm’s profit from accommodation is not smaller than its profit from deterrence.
Let φ(k) denote the function that maps the greatest pSF that fulfills the condition for each k. Then,
the small firm’s optimization calculus can be written as:
πSF (pSF , k) = pSFk → max! (1)
w.r.t. pSF ≤ φ(k)
4Theoretically, any positive entry cost  would be sufficient to guarantee that entry is ruled out in this case.
5We follow Gelman and Salop (1983) and assume reservation price rationing for calculating the residual demand.
This means that the consumers are served by the firms in the order of their willingness-to-pay, with the highest
being served first. The assumption is not crucial for the existence of the equilibria, but determines the distribution
of profits between the small and the dominant firm.
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Gelman and Salop (1983) show that the constraint holds with equality in equilibrium. The condition
for the optimal capacity k∗ is 0 = φ(k∗)+k∗φ′(k∗). This determines equilibrium prices p∗SF = φ(k
∗)
and also p∗DF = argmax π
accom
DF (k
∗).
3.2 Monopoly with Entry and Asymmetric Cost
This setting is similar to the aforementioned, except that the dominant firm faces a cost disadvan-
tage cDF > cSF = 0.
Proposition 2. In the non-cooperative equilibrium with one small firm and one cost-disadvantaged
dominant firm, entry is always accommodated.
Proof. The decisive difference to the case with symmetric cost is, that the small firm can set a price
below the dominant firm’s marginal cost (pSF < cDF ), forcing accommodation. This leaves us with
two candidates for equilibrium in this game (Cracau, 2013). One possibility is that the small firm
chooses the corner solution in which it sets a price just below the marginal cost of the dominant firm
(pSF = cDF −), serving the entire market up to its maximum capacity, i.e. k = min [kmax;D(cDF )]
where kmax is an exogenously given maximum capacity. The other possibility is that the small firm
uses an optimization as in Subsection 3.1, limiting its capacity and choosing a price that is greater
than the marginal cost of the dominant firm (pSF > cDF ) but will not be undercut in equilibrium.
The small firm chooses the more profitable of the two options, i.e. the corner solution arises if and
only if (cDF − )min [kmax;D(cDF )] > p∗SFk∗. In either case, the dominant firm accommodates
entry and maximizes its profit as a monopolist for the residual demand.
3.3 Duopoly with Entry and Symmetric Cost
The duopoly setting is modeled by introducing a second dominant firm. After the small firm’s
decision on a price-capacity pair, the two dominant firms decide simultaneously on their prices.
Consumers again prefer the lowest price products, but given equal prices they choose the dominant
firms’ products.
Proposition 3. In the non-cooperative equilibrium with one small firm and two dominant firms
with symmetric cost, entry is always deterred.
Proof. The two dominant firms (DF = DF1, DF2) face a Bertrand competition without capacity
constraints. As we assume zero marginal cost for all firms, in any equilibrium pDF1 = pDF2 = 0.
Because 0 > pSF is not feasible, the dominant firms do not accommodate entry. Hence, all firms
have zero profits in equilibrium.
3.4 Duopoly with Entry and Asymmetric cost
This setting is similar to the aforementioned, except that the dominant firms face a cost disadvan-
tage cDF1 = cDF2 = cDF > 0.
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Proposition 4. In the non-cooperative equilibrium with one small firm and two symmetrically
cost-disadvantaged dominant firms, entry is always accommodated.
Proof. The decisive difference to the case with symmetric cost is, that the small firm can set a price
below the dominant firms’ marginal cost, forcing accommodation. In contrast to the monopoly case
with asymmetric cost, the only option the small firm has in equilibrium is to undercut the dominant
firms by choosing a price pSF = cDF −  and serving the entire market up to its maximum capacity,
i.e. k = min [kmax;D(cDF )]. Entry and accommodation at a higher price is not an option, due to
the tough competition between the dominant firms. In equilibrium, the dominant firms set their
Bertrand price pDF1 = pDF2 = cDF and share the residual demand. Thus, the dominant firms’
equilibrium profits are zero.
4 Experimental Design
4.1 Treatment parameters
Our experiment includes 4 treatments in a 2x2-factorial design, corresponding to the four models
that we discussed in the previous section. We vary the number of dominant firms in the market on
the one hand and the marginal cost of the dominant firms on the other hand. The first treatment
SYM1 tests the original model of Gelman and Salop (1983). In the second treatment ADV1, we
introduce a cost disadvantage for the monopolist in the framework of the original model. In the
third treatment SYM2, we study situation analogous to SYM1 but with competition among two
dominant firms. Finally, in the fourth treatment ADV2, we combine both variations, introducing
a cost disadvantage for the two dominant firms.
We used a linear demand function D(p) = 100−p and allowed for integer prices in the range [0; 100].
We allowed for integer capacity decisions of the small firm in the range [0; 50], i.e. kmax = 50.
Table 1 summarizes the treatments and the corresponding equilibrium predictions.6
4.2 Experimental Procedure
For each treatment we collected 6 or 7 independent observations (see Table 1). In each session,
the game is played 20 rounds in fixed matchings of two or three participants. Instructions were
read aloud and questions were answered individually. Communication between the participants
was prohibited. Subjects were recruited on campus using ORSEE of Greiner (2004) and randomly
assigned to their roles and their matching partners. Subjects were mainly students of economics
and management.
The experimental software was programmed in z-Tree of Fischbacher (2007). We implemented a
6Due to player’s discrete strategy spaces, predictions slightly differ from the equilibria described in Section 3.
Note that in ADV2, pSF = 9, k = 50 and pDF = 10 is also an equilibrium yielding πSF = 450 and πDF = 0. This
equilibrium is, however, payoff-dominated.
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Table 1: Overview of treatment parameters
Treatment SYM1 ADV1 SYM2 ADV2
No. of DFs 1 1 2 2
Cost structure c = 0 cDF = 10, cSF = 0 c = 0 cDF = 10, cSF = 0
p∗SF 14 16 [1;100] 10
k∗ 30 45 [1;50] 50
p∗DF 35 23 1 11
π∗SF 370 720 0 500
π∗DF 1225 506 50 20
independ. obs. 7 7 6 7
sequence of decisions in line with the theoretical models described above. Before typing their price
and capacity decision, the participant playing the small firm had access to a what-if-calculator
that displayed the outcomes for any hypothetical constellation of decisions. Once the small firm’s
decision was completed, the dominant firms had the opportunity also to use the what-if-calculator,
which in this case, however, started up with the decision variables of the small firm already given.
Then, the dominant firms entered their price decision. Afterwards, sales quantities and profits were
calculated and reported together with the prices to all subjects in the matching group.
Preceding the game, subjects participated in a first set of 10 practice rounds without the small
firm, i.e. in which only the dominant firm(s) made decisions in a market without competition by
the small firm. Monetary incentives were introduced by randomly choosing one of these 10 rounds
to be paid at the end of the experiment. In these rounds, the small firm only observed the market
and received a small lump-sum payment. In SYM1 and ADV1, the dominant firm had to decide on
its price and served the market as a monopolist. The monopoly price pMSYM1 = 50 or p
M
ADV 1 = 55
is therefore the profit maximizing prediction in these treatments. In SYM2 and ADV2 the small
firm observed a price competition among the two dominant firms. The corresponding benchmark
is pDF1 = pDF2 = 1 ≈ pBSYM2 or pDF1 = pDF2 = 11 ≈ pBADV 2, respectively.
In a second set of 20 practice rounds with the small firm, we assigned a fixed capacity that was
randomly drawn from [1; 50] to the small firm. Other than the fact that the small firm had no
capacity choice, the rest of the game in the practice rounds with the small firm was identical to the
Judo game described above.
After the experiment, the subjects were paid anonymously. Their total payoffs consisted of a show-
up fee plus the earnings from the practice rounds plus the cumulated profits from the 20 game
rounds. Subjects were paid anonymously according to their total profit in the fictitious currency
ECU earned in the 20 game rounds plus their earnings from a randomly drawn round of each of
the two sets of practice rounds plus a small show-up fee. Average earnings were from 10 to 12  for
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a 1.5-hour session.7
5 Results
We use the first set of practice rounds without the small firm to check the consistency of the behavior
with the results of previous experiments reported in the literature. In the monopoly stages, the
dominant firm chooses the optimal price in 93% of the cases. This is well in line with the very
high percentage of optimal choices in earlier reported work (Potters et al., 2004). In the duopoly
stages, we observe an initial cooperation at about two thirds of monopoly prices and profits that
sharply decline over time. This is in line with previous results on Bertrand duopolies showing that
cooperation rates can be high but often fall over time (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Ku¨bler and
Mu¨ller, 2002).
5.1 Playing Judo against a monopolistic dominant firm
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Figure 1: SYM1 — Market development over time
Figure 1 shows the development of the decision parameters over time in SYM1. As can be seen in
the left panel, the dominant firms’ average price lies almost perfectly at the equilibrium price 35
with a slight tendency to rise in the last five rounds. Similarly, the small firms’ average capacity
choice is almost perfectly at the equilibrium capacity of 30 throughout the experiment. The small
firm’s average price, however, is significantly higher than the predicted equilibrium price of 14 with
no trend over time (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test, p = 0.016). This is surprising on the first sight,
because two of the three decision parameters seem in line with the equilibrium prediction while the
third is clearly out of equilibrium. It seems that the dominant firms are not only accommodating the
small firms as predicted by the equilibrium but are even willing to accept higher prices that allow a
7At the time of the experiment the exchange rate between USD and EURO was approximately 1 : 0.71.
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long term cooperation. In the last five rounds, dominant firms seem to be reaping the advantages of
the cooperative play by setting higher than equilibrium prices. The accommodation rate, shown in
the right hand panel of Figure 1, supports this interpretation of increasing accommodation. While
the accommodation rate is below 50% in rounds one and two, it quickly rises to above 80% and
peaks to 100% at the end of the experiment.8 This development is based on an increase of Judo
accommodation, i.e. accommodations towards Judo-type small firms as well as on an increase of
cooperative accommodation, i.e. accommodations that are not best responses.
Result 1. In SYM1, the accommodation rate significantly increases over time. This is a result of
both increasing Judo-type accommodation and cooperative accommodation.
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Figure 2: SYM1 — Small firms’ capacity and price choices and dominant firms’ responses: accom-
modations (circles) vs. non-accommodations (crosses)
Since the small firms’ average behavior is stable over time, the question is, why accommodation
rates rise so sharply. We find an answer to this question in Figure 2 that displays the distribution of
the decisions of the small firms in the capacity-price space. The left panel displays the decisions in
the first 10 rounds while the right panel displays the decisions in the last ten rounds. A cross in the
figure marks a small firm’s capacity-price choice to which the dominant firm responds by matching
or undercutting the small firm’s price (i.e. the dominant firm gives a ”price war” response). A circle
in the figure marks a capacity-price choice that is accommodated by the dominant firm (i.e. the
dominant firm does not match or undercut the small firm’s price). To organize the data, we have
added a curve depicting the Judo frontier that maps all capacity-price combinations that fulfill
the constraint in the optimization problem (1), i.e. that are candidates for the small firm’s Judo
equilibrium strategy. The Judo area that consists of all capacity-price combinations on or below
the Judo frontier contains the strategy choices by the small firm that should be accommodated by
8As in previous experimental studies with a finite horizon, we observe an ”end effect,” i.e. a drop in cooperation
in the last round (Argenton and Mu¨ller, 2012).
9
a profit maximizing dominant firm. In contrast, the best response to any combinations above the
Judo frontier is to match the price of the small firm.
The majority of the small firms’ decisions lies between the Judo prediction and the perfect collusion
outcome in which both firms split monopoly profits (nearly) equally. A visual inspection of the two
panels in Figure 2 indicates that accommodation is more likely for capacity-price decisions that are
either in the Judo area or include capacities close or below the Judo capacity. This visual impression
is supported by the statistics in Table 2. While almost 80% of the capacity-price decisions (over all
rounds in all sessions) that are in the Judo area are accommodated, the percentage falls to about
72% for the decisions outside the Judo area, but below the Judo capacity, and to 60% of those
outside the Judo area and above the Judo capacity. All in all, it is clear that accommodation is
related to the strategic limitation of the capacity by the small firms.
Table 2: SYM1 — Responses of the dominant firm
In Judo area
Outside Judo area Outside Judo area
Total(
k ≤ kJudo) (k > kJudo)
Accommodation 79.6% 72.1% 60.0% 74.3%
No accommodation 20.4% 27.9% 40.0% 25.7%
Total 31.4% 47.6% 25.0% 100%
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Figure 3: ADV1 — Market development over time
Figure 3 shows the development of the decision parameters over time in ADV1. As can be seen in
the left panel, the dominant firms’ average price lies significantly above the equilibrium price 23 with
no trend in time (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test, p = 0.016). In contrast, the small firms’ average
capacity choice is significantly below the equilibrium capacity of 45 throughout the experiment
(Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test, p = 0.016). The small firm’s average price, is significantly higher
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than the predicted equilibrium price of 16 but shows a sharp, significant decline over time (Wilcoxon
Signed Ranks test, p = 0.031). The accommodation rate, shown in the right panel of Figure 3, is
below 50% in the first rounds, but significantly increases over time and peaks at 100% towards the
end of the experiment. A closer look at the accommodation rate indicates that this development -
in contrast to SYM1 - is mainly based on an increase of Judo accommodations.
Result 2. In ADV1, the accommodation rate significantly increases over time. This is a result of
increasing self-restriction by small firms.
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Figure 4: ADV1 — Small firms’ capacity and price choices and dominant firms’ responses: accom-
modations (circles) vs. non-accommodations (crosses)
In Figure 4, we display the Judo area for ADV1 and also add a cost advantage area that includes
all prices below the marginal cost of the dominant firm. In the left panel, we see that the majority
of price-capacity decisions outside the Judo area are not accommodated. In contrast, the right
panel (exhibiting the last ten rounds) shows markably less decisions outside the Judo area. This
supports our finding of increased accommodation due to an increased tendency of the small firms
to limit their capacities and prices. Table 3 summarizes the entry and accommodation decisions in
ADV1. As in SYM1, we find the highest percentage of accommodations in the Judo area. Small
firms with price-capacity pairs outside the Judo area are only accommodated if their capacity is
below the equilibrium prediction. It seems that the small firms try to use their cost advantage to
enter the market on a large scale. In turn, the dominant firm refuses cooperation and matches the
small firm’s price in most of the cases. Thus, the cost asymmetry that is to the advantage of the
small firm from a game theoretic point of view behaviorally goes against it.
To study the effect of price and capacity choice and the cost advantage on the accommodation
decision of the dominant firms in more detail, we run a random-effects logit regression with accom-
modation as the dependent variable. The results are given in Table 4. As expected, both the price
and the capacity of the small firm have a negative impact on accommodation by the dominant
11
Table 3: ADV1 — Responses of the dominant firm
In Judo area
Outside Judo area Outside Judo area
(
k ≤ kJudo) (k > kJudo)
Accommodation 88.2% 83.7% 2.1%
No accommodation 11.8% 16.3% 97.9%
Total 17.8% 26.4% 32.9%
In cost advantage
Total
area
Accommodation 81.2% 57.1%
No accommodation 18.8% 42.9%
Total 22.9% 100%
Table 4: Judo in a Monopoly — Regression results
Random-effects logit regression with accommodation
as the dependent variable.
(Wald χ2 = 64.50, p = 0.0000)
Coefficient Standard error Z P > |Z|
Constant 10.76722 1.32189 8.15 0.000
pSF −0.18220 0.02307 −7.90 0.000
k −0.14602 0.02327 −6.28 0.000
ADV −1.32469 0.94098 −1.41 0.159
firm. The coefficient of the dummy for the advantage treatment is negative but not significant.
Hence, the treatment effect seems to be fully contained in the different price and capacity choices
of the small firm. There is obviously no additional effect of the treatment that only influences the
dominant firms accommodation choices.
Result 3. In the monopoly treatments, the accommodation rate is significantly higher for small
firms that limit capacity and choose low prices.
We present an overview of the observed profits in the monopoly treatments in Figure 5. In SYM1,
firms profits are above the Judo equilibrium prediction resulting from cooperative behavior in
pricing. As can be seen in Table 5, this cooperation is effective in 71% of the cases for the small
firm, in 70% for the dominant firm, in 49% for both. In contrast, the small firms in ADV1 hardly
manage to achieve above equilibrium profits (only in 9% of the cases). This finding is supported
by the right panel of Figure 5 that shows that the small firms’ profits are dramatically lower in
ADV1 than in SYM1. Note, however, that the small firms’ profits are increasing over time in
ADV1, coming closer to the equilibrium level towards the end of the experiment. Correspondingly,
the dominant firms profits in ADV1 decrease over time, also getting closer to the equilibrium level.
12
0500
1000
1500
2000
2500
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Rounds
Profit SF Profit DF
(a) SYM1
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Rounds
Profit SF Profit DF
(b) ADV1
Figure 5: Average profits over time: small firms (transparent line) vs. dominant firms (solid line)
vs. predictions (dashed lines)
These observations are well in line with the finding that the small firms reduce their prices over
time in ADV1 and are increasingly accommodated by the dominant firms.
Table 5: Percentage of profits at least at the Judo prediction (accommodations only in parentheses)
SYM1 ADV1
Small firms only 71% (95%) 9% (16%)
Dominant firms only 70% (67%) 76% (70%)
Both firms 49% (66%) 9% (16%)
Result 4. In SYM1, both small and dominant firms earn significantly more than in the Judo
equilibrium. In ADV1, small firms earn significantly less while dominant firms earn significantly
more than in the Judo equilibrium, but earnings approach equilibrium levels over time.
5.2 Playing Judo against two dominant firms
Figure 6 displays the market dynamics in SYM2. We see that the prices of both firms are signifi-
cantly decreasing over time. However, the prices remain significantly above the Bertrand prediction.
The capacity of the small firm shows no trend in time. The accommodation rate also shows no
significant trend over time. Note that in SYM2 accommodation is never a best response, i.e. all
observed accommodations are evidence for some extent of cooperative behavior. Figure 7 shows the
price-capacity choices of the small firms and the accommodation decisions of the dominant firms
in SYM2. Obviously, the small firm is only accommodated at very low price and capacity choices.
In total, accommodation is only found in 24% of the observations, which is significantly less than
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Figure 6: SYM2 — Market development over time
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Figure 7: SYM2 — Small firms’ capacity and price choices and dominant firms’ responses: accom-
modations (circles) vs. non-accommodations (crosses)
in SYM1.9 For ADV2, the development of decision variables and accommodation rate over the
20 rounds is shown in Figure 8. As in SYM2, prices of all firms significantly decrease over time,
approaching the equilibrium values. Note that in ADV2 the predicted equilibrium price is at the
marginal cost of the dominant firms. The capacities of the small firms in ADV2 are generally close
to the maximum capacity (50 units), which is higher than in all other treatments. From the right
panel of Figure 8, we see that the accommodation rate slightly increases over time even though
the small firms do not limit their capacities. This is due to fact that the small firms reduce their
9The low prices in SYM2 are not due to the additional competition that arises from the small firm. Although a
higher number of market competitors is typically expected to increase competition (Huck et al., 2004), the small firm
in this treatment only amplifies the price and profit decline already observed in the duopoly practice rounds without
a small firm.
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Figure 8: ADV2 — Market development over time
prices almost down to the marginal cost of the dominant firms, leaving them with no option, but to
accommodate. Since accommodation is basically inevitable, one may conjecture that the dominant
firms will increase cooperation over time. However, in line with the observed price decline in SYM2
and earlier Bertrand duopoly results, prices tend to decline over time, even though accommodation
is increased.
Figure 9 visualizes the price-capacity decisions in ADV2. We observe that - just as in SYM2 –
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Figure 9: ADV2 — Small firms’ capacity and price choices and dominant firms’ responses: accom-
modations (circles) vs. non-accommodations (crosses)
many small firms choose prices above the equilibrium price and are not accommodated. In the last
rounds of the experiment (right panel of Figure 9), we can find the vast majority of small firms
close to the equilibrium point, with capacity close to the maximum (50) and prices close to the
marginal cost of the dominant firms (10). This corresponds to the observed price decline and the
increasing accommodation rate. Table 6 displays the results of a random effects logit regression
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Table 6: Judo in a Duopoly — Regression results
Random-effects logit regression with accommodation
as the dependent variable.
(Wald χ2 = 26.98, p = 0.0000)
Coefficient Standard error Z P > |Z|
Constant 0.84013 1.14821 0.73 0.464
pSF −0.21755 0.04479 −4.86 0.000
k −0.01049 0.02201 −0.48 0.634
ADV 2.25456 0.92652 2.43 0.015
with accommodation as the dependent variable. Just as in the monopoly case, we find that the
small firms prices have a strong and significantly negative influence on accommodation, with ac-
commodation more likely the lower the chosen prices. However, unlike the observed behavior in
the monopoly case, we find no effect of capacity choices on accommodation. Moreover, we find
a positive and significant treatment effect, which is not surprising, because accommodation is the
equilibrium behavior in ADV2 but not in SYM2.
Result 5. In the duopoly treatments, accommodation rate is significantly higher for cost-advantaged
small firms. Accommodation is more likely, the lower the small firms price is, but it is not affected
by capacity limitation.
An overview of the development of profits in the duopoly treatments is presented in Figure 10. In
the left panel, we see that the the small firms’ profits in SYM2 remain very close to the equilib-
rium prediction of zero profits. The dominant firms’ profits lie significantly above the equilibrium
prediction but show a significant negative trend.
The right-hand panel of Figure 10 shows the profits in ADV2. The small firms’ profits are sig-
nificantly lower than the equilibrium prediction of 500, whereas the dominant firms’ profits are
significantly higher than the equilibrium prediction. This is due to the fact that some small firms
do not use their cost advantage to force accommodation and are not accommodated at higher
prices. As a consequence, dominant firms can often serve a market that is larger than predicted.
Result 6. In SYM2, both firms’ profits are above the equilibrium level with the dominant firms’
profits declining over time. In ADV2, small firms earn significantly less while dominant firms earn
significantly more than in equilibrium.
6 Discussion and economic implications
Our results indicate that capacity and price limitation as predicted by the Judo equilibrium can
be a successful strategy for small firms to survive in a Bertrand competition with homogeneous
goods. In the original Judo setting with one dominant monopolist and a small firm, the small
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Figure 10: Average profits over time: small firms (transparent line) vs. dominant firms (solid line)
vs. predictions (dashed lines)
firm’s capacity limitation is not only rewarded with accommodation, but often leads to cooperative
pricing above equilibrium.10 Surprisingly, we observe significantly less cooperation when the small
firm has a cost advantage. It seems that the expansive behavior of the small firm in the early
rounds of this setting induce aggressive responses by the dominant firm and hampers cooperation.
In contrast to the high degree of cooperation observed in the original Judo setting, we observe
almost no cooperation in markets in which a small firm competes with two dominant firms. In
these markets, small firms with a cost advantage are better off than those without, because they
can survive with positive profits by choosing a price that cannot be matched by the dominant firms.
Hence, while a cost advantage is a profit disadvantage in the competition with a single dominant
firm, it is a profit advantage in the competition against multiple dominant firms.
Our behavioral results have important implications for small firms such as local companies com-
peting against global market leaders. We find that a small firm facing a stiff price competition
between dominant firms has no option but to seek cost leadership. If however, the small firm faces
a high-price market, for example with a dominant monopolistic incumbent, pursuing cost leadership
may be interpreted as aggressive behavior and may decrease the probability of accommodation by
the dominant firm. In these ”relaxed” markets, it seems more advantageous for the small firm to
signal cooperation by limiting capacity.
This result may account for the fact that in markets such as transportation markets, in which a
credible capacity limitation is easily achieved, we observe different strategies for small firms. In
10In fact, we observe more cooperation than in Kreps-Scheinkman-type settings (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983)
with symmetric duopolies (Anderhub et al., 2003). It seems that we observe more cooperation because the dominant
firm in our setting reciprocates after having observed whether the small firm has limited capacity and priced high
enough to signal cooperation. In the experiment by Anderhub et al. (2003), both capacity choices and both price
choices are simultaneous, thus allowing for more strategic uncertainty and leading to less cooperation.
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markets with a dominant incumbent, capacity (size) limitation provides a tool for small competi-
tors to successfully coexist with the monopolistic dominant firm. DeCamp Bus Lines, for example,
operates at a smaller scale than NJ Transit that dominates the market, offering a smaller number
of bus trips per day from New Jersey to New York and charging slightly lower prices. NJ Transit in
turn accommodates this small competitor as it remains a quasi-monopolist for the residual market.
In other markets, where competition between market incumbents is already high, e.g. in the US
airline market, we find small local competitors only surviving if they have a cost advantage. Alle-
giant Air for example operates at a small scale (less than 6 million passengers in 2010) compared
to Delta Air Lines (more than 111 million passengers in 2010) and United Airlines (nearly 100
million passengers in 2010) but has a lower per passenger cost (in 2010, approximately 95 USD for
Allegiant vs. 192 USD for Delta and 258 USD for United).11 For the limited number of routes
Allegiant Air serves, they use their cost advantage and offer prices below that of their dominant
competitors.
While our study provides detailed insights in the competition behavior in a single market with
small and dominant firms, more research is needed to analyze other market environments. A nat-
ural extension is the analysis of small firms competing against dominant firms that are active in
multiple markets. Moreover, we could use our methodology to study behavior in environments
that entail market growth as in Shen and Villas-Boas (2010). Another interesting aspect of market
dynamics concerns the sustainability of competition after entry. Analyzing empirical data, Geroski
(1995), for example, reports that most small firms are driven out of the market before they can
reach the size of an average incumbent. Our appraoch can be easily adapted to study these and
other sustainability aspects of oligopoly markets with competitors of different sizes.
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Experiment 1: Instructions 
Welcome to the experiment! 
From now on, please stop any communication and read the following information with great care. Questions will 
be answered after reading the instructions individually at your place. 
 
The following experiment deals with the sale of goods. There is one well-established firm. Moreover, there is a new 
firm which enters the market. 
 The experiment consists of 2 stages, which are played consecutively. 
 At the beginning of the experiment, you are randomly assigned the role of the well-established firm or the 
new firm. 
o During the whole experiment, the assignment of roles remains fixed. 
 At the beginning of the experiment, pairs of firms (1 well-established firm/1 new firm) are randomly 
assigned to the markets. 
o During the whole experiment, the assignment of the pairs is fixed. 
Stage 1 
First, 10 rounds will be played with the well-established firm being the sole firm in the market. 
Activities of the new firm: 
 If you were assigned the role of the new firm, you have no activities in this stage. However you can 
observe the well-established firm’s decision on a sales price. 
Activities of the well-established firm: 
 If you were assigned the role of the well-established firm, you decide on your sales price in Taler. 
o Your sales price is integer from the interval [0; 100] Taler. 
Round payoffs: 
 The new firm earns 4500 Taler. 
 Round payoff of the well-established firm: 
= sales price X (100 – sales price) 
 
At the end of this stage, one round will be chosen randomly and this round determines the payoff of the well-
established firm. (The exchange rate is: 1500 Taler = 1 Euro.) 
Stage 2 
There will be 20 practice rounds. Afterward, 20 rounds will be played which are payoff-relevant. At the end of this 
stage, the sum of all round payoffs determines the total payoff for the well-established firm and the new firm. (The 
exchange rate is: 1500 Taler = 1 Euro.) 
Activities of the new firm: 
 If you were assigned the role of the new firm, you decide on your sales price in Taler. 
 Moreover you decide on your production capacity (= the maximum output you can sell.) 
o In the practice rounds, your production capacity will be assigned randomly. 
o In the payoff rounds, you decide on your production capacity. 
o Your sales price as well as your production capacity is integer from the interval [0; 50]. 
 You can use a what-if calculator. 
Activities of the well-established firm: 
 If you were assigned the role of the well-established firm, you are informed about the decision of the new 
firm. You are informed about its sales price and its production capacity 
 Afterward, you decide on your sales price in Taler. 
o Your sales price is integer from the interval [0; 100] Taler. 
 A well-established firm has no capacity limitation. 
 You can use a what-if calculator which already includes the decisions of the new firm. 
 
 
Round payoffs: 
Depending on the decisions of both players, two scenarios are possible: 
Scenario A: The well-established firm has chosen a sales price which is equal to or below that of the new firm. 
 Round payoff of the new firm 
= 0 
 Round payoff of the well-established firm: 
= (sales price – 10) X (100 – sales price) 
Scenario B: The well-established firm has chosen a sales price which is above that of the new firm. 
 Round payoff of the new firm 
= sales price X capacity 
 Round payoff of the well-established firm: 
= (sales price – 10) X (100 – capacity – sales price) 
Please note: negative payoffs are not considered. 
 
Comprehension Questions: 
Soon, you will see a what-if calculator on the screen. You can type in any sales price of the new firm, any 
production capacity of the new firm and any sales price of the well-established firm. Then, you can 
calculate the corresponding profits for both firms. 
For the following 4 examples, please calculate the profit of the new firm and of the well-established firm 
and indicate whether this refers to scenario A or B. 
 
Example 1    Example 2  
Price of the new firm:  35  Price of the new firm:  45  
Capacity:  42  Capacity:  16  
Price of the well-established firm:  23  Price of the well-established firm:  53  
Profit of the new firm: [  ] Profit of the new firm: [  ] 
Profit of the well-established firm: [  ] Profit of the well-established firm: [  ] 
Scenario: [  ] Scenario: [  ] 
 
 
Example 3    Example 4  
Price of the new firm:  10  Price of the new firm:  11  
Capacity:  37  Capacity:  14  
Price of the well-established firm:  22  Price of the well-established firm:  11  
Profit of the new firm: [  ] Profit of the new firm: [  ] 
Profit of the well-established firm: [  ] Profit of the well-established firm: [  ] 
Scenario: [  ] Scenario: [  ] 
 
Experiment 2: Instructions 
Welcome to the experiment! 
From now on, please stop any communication and read the following information with great care. Questions will 
be answered after reading the instructions individually at your place. 
 
The following experiment deals with the sale of goods. There is one well-established firm. Moreover, there is a new 
firm which enters the market. 
 The experiment consists of 2 stages, which are played consecutively. 
 At the beginning of the experiment, you are randomly assigned the role of the well-established firm or the 
new firm. 
o During the whole experiment, the assignment of roles remains fixed. 
 At the beginning of the experiment, pairs of firms (1 well-established firm/1 new firm) are randomly 
assigned to the markets. 
o During the whole experiment, the assignment of the pairs is fixed. 
 Each player earns a fix payoff of 5 EURO. 
Stage 1 
First, 10 rounds will be played with the well-established firm being the sole firm in the market. 
Activities of the new firm: 
 If you were assigned the role of the new firm, you have no activities in this stage. However you can 
observe the well-established firm’s decision on a sales price. 
Activities of the well-established firm: 
 If you were assigned the role of the well-established firm, you decide on your sales price in Taler. 
o Your sales price is integer from the interval [0; 100] Taler. 
Round payoffs: 
 The new firm earns 1500 Taler. 
 Round payoff of the well-established firm: 
= (sales price – 10) X (100 – sales price) 
 
At the end of this stage, one round will be chosen randomly and this round determines the payoff of the well-
established firm. (The exchange rate is: 1500 Taler = 1 Euro.) 
 
Stage 2 
There will be 20 practice rounds. Afterward, 20 rounds will be played which are payoff-relevant. At the end of this 
stage, the sum of all round payoffs determines the total payoff for the well-established firm and the new firm. (The 
exchange rate is: 1500 Taler = 1 Euro.) 
Activities of the new firm: 
 If you were assigned the role of the new firm, you decide on your sales price in Taler. 
 Moreover you decide on your production capacity (= the maximum output you can sell.) 
o In the practice rounds, your production capacity will be assigned randomly. 
o In the payoff rounds, you decide on your production capacity. 
o Your sales price as well as your production capacity is integer from the interval [0; 50]. 
 You can use a what-if calculator. 
Activities of the well-established firm: 
 If you were assigned the role of the well-established firm, you are informed about the decision of the new 
firm. You are informed about its sales price and its production capacity 
 Afterward, you decide on your sales price in Taler. 
o Your sales price is integer from the interval [0; 100] Taler. 
 A well-established firm has no capacity limitation. 
 You can use a what-if calculator which already includes the decisions of the new firm. 
Round payoffs: 
Depending on the decisions of both players, two scenarios are possible: 
Scenario A: The well-established firm has chosen a sales price which is equal to or below that of the new firm. 
 Round payoff of the new firm 
= 0 
 Round payoff of the well-established firm: 
= (sales price – 10) X (100 – sales price) 
Scenario B: The well-established firm has chosen a sales price which is above that of the new firm. 
 Round payoff of the new firm 
= sales price X capacity 
 Round payoff of the well-established firm: 
= (sales price – 10) X (100 – capacity – sales price) 
Please note: negative payoffs are not considered. 
 
Comprehension Questions: 
Soon, you will see a what-if calculator on the screen. You can type in any sales price of the new firm, any 
production capacity of the new firm and any sales price of the well-established firm. Then, you can 
calculate the corresponding profits for both firms. 
For the following 4 examples, please calculate the profit of the new firm and of the well-established firm 
and indicate whether this refers to scenario A or B. 
 
Example 1    Example 2  
Price of the new firm:  35  Price of the new firm:  45  
Capacity:  42  Capacity:  16  
Price of the well-established firm:  23  Price of the well-established firm:  53  
Profit of the new firm: [  ] Profit of the new firm: [  ] 
Profit of the well-established firm: [  ] Profit of the well-established firm: [  ] 
Scenario: [  ] Scenario: [  ] 
 
 
Example 3    Example 4  
Price of the new firm:  10  Price of the new firm:  11  
Capacity:  37  Capacity:  14  
Price of the well-established firm:  22  Price of the well-established firm:  11  
Profit of the new firm: [  ] Profit of the new firm: [  ] 
Profit of the well-established firm: [  ] Profit of the well-established firm: [  ] 
Scenario: [  ] Scenario: [  ] 
 
Experiment : Instructions 
Welcome to the experiment! 
From now on, please stop any communication and read the following information with great care. Questions will 
be answered after reading the instructions individually at your place. 
 
The following experiment deals with the sale of goods. There are two well-established firms. Moreover, there is a 
new firm which enters the market. 
 The experiment consists of 2 stages, which are played consecutively. 
 At the beginning of the experiment, you are randomly assigned the role of one of the two well-established 
firms or the new firm. 
o During the whole experiment, the assignment of roles remains fixed. 
 At the beginning of the experiment, groups of firms (2 well-established firms/1 new firm) are randomly 
assigned to the markets. 
o During the whole experiment, the assignment of the pairs is fixed. 
 
Stage 1 
First, 10 rounds will be played with the well-established firms being the sole firms in the market. 
Activities of the new firm: 
 If you were assigned the role of the new firm, you have no activities in this stage. However you can 
observe the well-established firms’ decisions on their sales prices. 
Activities of the well-established firms: 
 If you were assigned the role of the well-established firm, you decide on your sales price in Taler. 
o Your sales price is integer from the interval [0; 100] Taler. 
Round payoffs: 
 The new firm earns 3000 Taler. 
 If both well-established firms have chosen the same sales price: 
o Round payoff of each well-established firm: 
= 0.5 X [(sales price – 10) X (100 – sales price)] 
 If the two well-established firms have chosen different sales prices: 
o Round payoff of the well-established firm with the low price: 
(sales price – 10) X (100 – sales price) 
o Round payoff of the well-established firm with the high price: 
= 0 
At the end of this stage, one round will be chosen randomly and this round determines the payoffs of the well-
established firms. (The exchange rate is: 1000 Taler = 1 Euro.) 
 
Stage 2 
There will be 20 practice rounds. Afterward, 20 rounds will be played which are payoff-relevant. At the end of this 
stage, the sum of all round payoffs determines the total payoff for the well-established firms and the new firm. 
(The exchange rate is: 1000 Taler = 1 Euro.) 
Activities of the new firm: 
 If you were assigned the role of the new firm, you decide on your sales price in Taler. 
 Moreover you decide on your production capacity (= the maximum output you can sell.) 
o In the practice rounds, your production capacity will be assigned randomly. 
o In the payoff rounds, you decide on your production capacity. 
o Your sales price as well as your production capacity is integer from the interval [0; 50]. 
 You can use a what-if calculator. 
 
 
 
 
Activities of the well-established firms: 
 If you were assigned the role of the well-established firm, you are informed about the decision of the new 
firm. You are informed about its sales price and its production capacity 
 Afterward, you decide on your sales price in Taler. 
o Your sales price is integer from the interval [0; 100] Taler. 
 A well-established firm has no capacity limitation. 
 You can use a what-if calculator which already includes the decisions of the new firm. 
 
Round payoffs: 
Depending on the decisions of the three players, 4 scenarios are possible: 
Scenario A: Both well-established firms have chosen the same sales price. This sales price is equal to or below that 
of the new firm. 
 Round payoff of the new firm 
= 0 
 Round payoff of each well-established firm: 
= 0.5 X [(sales price – 10) X (100 – sales price)] 
Scenario B: The two well-established firms have chosen different sales prices. The lower one of these sales prices is 
equal to or below that of the new firm. 
 Round payoff of the new firm 
= 0 
 Round payoff of the well-established firm with the low price: 
= (sales price – 10) X (100 – sales price) 
 Round payoff of the well-established firm with the high price: 
= 0 
Scenario C: The well-established firm has chosen the same sales price. This sales price is above that of the new firm. 
 Round payoff of the new firm 
= sales price X capacity 
 Round payoff of each well-established firm: 
= 0.5 X [(sales price – 10) X (100 – capacity – sales price)] 
Scenario D: The two well-established firms have chosen different sales prices. Both of these sales prices are above 
that of the new firm. 
 Round payoff of the new firm 
= sales price X capacity 
 Round payoff of the well-established firm with the low price: 
= (sales price – 10) X (100 – capacity – sales price) 
 Round payoff of the well-established firm with the high price: 
= 0 
Please note: negative payoffs are not considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comprehension Questions: 
Soon, you will see a what-if calculator on the screen. You can type in any sales price of the new firm, any 
production capacity of the new firm and any combination of sales price of the well-established firms. 
Then, you can calculate the corresponding profits for all firms. 
For the following 4 examples, please calculate the profit of the new firm and of each well-established 
firm and indicate whether this refers to scenario A, B, C or D. 
 
Example 1    Example 2  
Price of the new firm:  35  Price of the new firm:  45  
Capacity:  42  Capacity:  16  
Price of the well-established firm 1:  23  Price of the well-established firm 1:  53  
Price of the well-established firm 2:   23  Price of the well-established firm 2:     66  
Profit of the new firm: [  ] Profit of the new firm: [  ] 
Profit of the well-established firm 1: [  ] Profit of the well-established firm 1: [  ] 
Profit of the well-established firm 2: [  ] Profit of the well-established firm 2: [  ] 
Scenario: [  ] Scenario: [  ] 
 
 
Example 3    Example 4  
Price of the new firm:  12  Price of the new firm:  11  
Capacity:  24  Capacity:  14  
Price of the well-established firm 1:  21  Price of the well-established firm 1:  27  
Price of the well-established firm 2:   21  Price of the well-established firm 2:   11  
Profit of the new firm: [  ] Profit of the new firm: [  ] 
Profit of the well-established firm 1: [  ] Profit of the well-established firm 1: [  ] 
Profit of the well-established firm 2: [  ] Profit of the well-established firm 2: [  ] 
Scenario: [  ] Scenario: [  ] 
 
Experiment 4: Instructions 
Welcome to the experiment! 
From now on, please stop any communication and read the following information with great care. Questions will 
be answered after reading the instructions individually at your place. 
 
The following experiment deals with the sale of goods. There are two well-established firms. Moreover, there is a 
new firm which enters the market. 
 The experiment consists of 2 stages, which are played consecutively. 
 At the beginning of the experiment, you are randomly assigned the role of one of the two well-established 
firms or the new firm. 
o During the whole experiment, the assignment of roles remains fixed. 
 At the beginning of the experiment, groups of firms (2 well-established firms/1 new firm) are randomly 
assigned to the markets. 
o During the whole experiment, the assignment of the pairs is fixed. 
 Each player earns a fix payoff of 5 EURO. 
 
Stage 1 
First, 10 rounds will be played with the well-established firms being the sole firms in the market. 
Activities of the new firm: 
 If you were assigned the role of the new firm, you have no activities in this stage. However you can 
observe the well-established firms’ decisions on their sales prices. 
Activities of the well-established firms: 
 If you were assigned the role of the well-established firm, you decide on your sales price in Taler. 
o Your sales price is integer from the interval [0; 100] Taler. 
Round payoffs: 
 The new firm earns 1000 Taler. 
 If both well-established firms have chosen the same sales price: 
o Round payoff of each well-established firm: 
= 0.5 X [(sales price – 10) X (100 – sales price)] 
 If the two well-established firms have chosen different sales prices: 
o Round payoff of the well-established firm with the low price: 
(sales price – 10) X (100 – sales price) 
o Round payoff of the well-established firm with the high price: 
= 0 
At the end of this stage, one round will be chosen randomly and this round determines the payoffs of the well-
established firms. (The exchange rate is: 1000 Taler = 1 Euro.) 
 
Stage 2 
There will be 20 practice rounds. Afterward, 20 rounds will be played which are payoff-relevant. At the end of this 
stage, the sum of all round payoffs determines the total payoff for the well-established firms and the new firm. 
(The exchange rate is: 1000 Taler = 1 Euro.) 
Activities of the new firm: 
 If you were assigned the role of the new firm, you decide on your sales price in Taler. 
 Moreover you decide on your production capacity (= the maximum output you can sell.) 
o In the practice rounds, your production capacity will be assigned randomly. 
o In the payoff rounds, you decide on your production capacity. 
o Your sales price as well as your production capacity is integer from the interval [0; 50]. 
 You can use a what-if calculator. 
 
 
Activities of the well-established firms: 
 If you were assigned the role of the well-established firm, you are informed about the decision of the new 
firm. You are informed about its sales price and its production capacity 
 Afterward, you decide on your sales price in Taler. 
o Your sales price is integer from the interval [0; 100] Taler. 
 A well-established firm has no capacity limitation. 
 You can use a what-if calculator which already includes the decisions of the new firm. 
 
Round payoffs: 
Depending on the decisions of the three players, 4 scenarios are possible: 
Scenario A: Both well-established firms have chosen the same sales price. This sales price is equal to or below that 
of the new firm. 
 Round payoff of the new firm 
= 0 
 Round payoff of each well-established firm: 
= 0.5 X [(sales price – 10) X (100 – sales price)] 
Scenario B: The two well-established firms have chosen different sales prices. The lower one of these sales prices is 
equal to or below that of the new firm. 
 Round payoff of the new firm 
= 0 
 Round payoff of the well-established firm with the low price: 
= (sales price – 10) X (100 – sales price) 
 Round payoff of the well-established firm with the high price: 
= 0 
Scenario C: The well-established firm has chosen the same sales price. This sales price is above that of the new firm. 
 Round payoff of the new firm 
= sales price X capacity 
 Round payoff of each well-established firm: 
= 0.5 X [(sales price – 10) X (100 – capacity – sales price)] 
Scenario D: The two well-established firms have chosen different sales prices. Both of these sales prices are above 
that of the new firm. 
 Round payoff of the new firm 
= sales price X capacity 
 Round payoff of the well-established firm with the low price: 
= (sales price – 10) X (100 – capacity – sales price) 
 Round payoff of the well-established firm with the high price: 
= 0 
Please note: negative payoffs are not considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comprehension Questions: 
Soon, you will see a what-if calculator on the screen. You can type in any sales price of the new firm, any 
production capacity of the new firm and any combination of sales price of the well-established firms. 
Then, you can calculate the corresponding profits for all firms. 
For the following 4 examples, please calculate the profit of the new firm and of each well-established 
firm and indicate whether this refers to scenario A, B, C or D. 
 
Example 1    Example 2  
Price of the new firm:  35  Price of the new firm:  45  
Capacity:  42  Capacity:  16  
Price of the well-established firm 1:  23  Price of the well-established firm 1:  53  
Price of the well-established firm 2:   23  Price of the well-established firm 2:     66  
Profit of the new firm: [  ] Profit of the new firm: [  ] 
Profit of the well-established firm 1: [  ] Profit of the well-established firm 1: [  ] 
Profit of the well-established firm 2: [  ] Profit of the well-established firm 2: [  ] 
Scenario: [  ] Scenario: [  ] 
 
 
Example 3    Example 4  
Price of the new firm:  12  Price of the new firm:  11  
Capacity:  24  Capacity:  14  
Price of the well-established firm 1:  21  Price of the well-established firm 1:  27  
Price of the well-established firm 2:   21  Price of the well-established firm 2:   11  
Profit of the new firm: [  ] Profit of the new firm: [  ] 
Profit of the well-established firm 1: [  ] Profit of the well-established firm 1: [  ] 
Profit of the well-established firm 2: [  ] Profit of the well-established firm 2: [  ] 
Scenario: [  ] Scenario: [  ] 
 
 
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg
Faculty of Economics and Management
P.O. Box  4120 | 39016 Magdeburg | Germany
Tel.: +49 (0) 3 91 / 67-1 85 84
Fax: +49 (0) 3 91 / 67-1 21 20
www.ww.uni-magdeburg.dew.f w.ovgu. e/femm
ISSN 1615-4274
